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 We describe a surprising developmental pattern across three different kinds of 
problems and age ranges. Younger learners are better than older ones at learning unusual 
abstract causal principles from evidence.	  We	  explore	  two	  factors	  that	  might	  contribute	  to	  this	  counter-­‐intuitive	  result.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  as	  our	  knowledge	  grows	  we	  become	  less	  open	  to	  new	  ideas.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  younger	  minds	  and	  brains	  are	  intrinsically	  more	  flexible	  and	  exploratory,	  although	  less	  efficient	  as	  a	  result.  
 






There is a tension in cognitive development. Children do worse than adults on 
many measures. As they grow older, children become more focused, they plan better, 
and, of course, they know more. Yet very young children are prodigious learners, and 
especially good at learning about causes. Preschoolers, toddlers, even infants, construct 
everyday causal theories of objects, living things and minds (e.g. Gelman & Wellman, 
1992; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).  How can the youngest children learn so much so 
quickly and accurately when their knowledge and cognitive abilities seem so limited? 
 We suggest that the apparent limitations in children’s knowledge and cognitive 
abilities may actually sometimes make them better learners. Empirically, we have 
recently found a similar pattern across different problems and age ranges. Younger 
learners are, surprisingly, better than older ones at learning unlikely or unusual abstract 
causal hypotheses from evidence. 
There are some other examples of this counter-intuitive developmental pattern. 
Younger infants can learn distinctions between sounds that are not used in their native 
language better than older infants and adults (Kuhl, 2008, Werker, 2012) and younger 
children are more able to generate alternative uses for a tool than older children 
(Defeyeter & German, 2003). These studies also suggest that younger learners might 
sometimes be open to more possibilities than older ones.  
Theoretically, we propose two possible, complementary, explanations for this 
pattern, inspired by viewing children’s learning through the lens of computer science. 
Younger learners may do better because they are less biased by their existing knowledge 
or because their brains and minds are inherently more flexible.  
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Empirical studies  
 Many studies show that children as young as 15 months old can learn specific 
cause-effect relationships from statistical data (Gopnik et al. 2004; Gopnik & Schulz, 
2007; Gweon & Schulz, 2011; Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). These studies have the typical 
developmental pattern -- younger and older children are similar or older children do 
better.  In the new studies we describe here we investigated whether children can learn 
more abstract, general, causal principles or “overhypotheses” – that is, hypotheses about 
which kinds of more specific hypotheses are likely (Kemp et al. 2007).  
For example, suppose you observe that stomach aches are caused by eating bad 
food, rashes by touching weeds, and coughs by inhaling pollen. You might form the 
overhypothesis or “framework theory” (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012) that illnesses have 
biological causes. When you then seek the cause of a new illness, like AIDS, you might 
think biological causes like viruses, bacteria or genes, are more likely than psychological 
causes like anxiety. 
In the studies we describe here, learners see a series of events and have a choice 
between two abstract hypotheses, A and B, that could explain those events. Hypothesis A 
is initially less likely than B, at least from the adult perspective, but is better supported by 
the evidence the learner has seen. Younger learners are more likely to infer A than older 
learners, who, despite the data, are more likely to stick with B.    
 The first study exhibiting this pattern explored how preschoolers learn high-level 
principles of social cognition (Seiver, Gopnik, & Goodman, 2013). Adults in Western 
cultures believe that actions are caused by personal traits that are stable over time but 
differ among individual people, like being brave or timid. They explain what people do in 
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terms of such traits even when the evidence shows that people are actually reacting to 
particular situations – they have a “trait bias” (Kelley, 1967).   
 We gave four- and six-year-old children statistical evidence that supported either 
a trait or situation explanation.  In the “person” condition a character called Sally 
(represented by a doll) was usually willing to play on both a skateboard and diving board 
(represented by miniature toys) while Josie usually avoided both toys.  In the “situation” 
condition, neither character approached the skateboard, though both approached the 
diving board. In a control, the data supported both hypotheses equally. Then we asked 
children why each character approached or avoided the toy.  
 Four-year-olds accurately inferred the right kind of cause from the data (Fig. 1). 
When the data supported a personal trait explanation, the children did too, often inventing 
trait-like causes  (“Josie’s the little sister, and Sally’s the big one”). But they also said 
that the character acted because of the situation when that fit the data – “it looks scary” or 
“it looks fun”.  Six-year-olds, in contrast, did much worse in the situation condition. Like 
adults, they showed a strong bias towards trait explanations even when the evidence did 
not support them.   
 Notably, the children’s inferences extended beyond these particular dolls and 
toys. Their explanations invoked more general principles – older sisters are better than 
younger ones at many skills, people are unlikely to play with anything that looks scary. 
We also asked them to make predictions about new actors and situations. In the person 
condition, all the children said that the brave character would also be brave if she faced a 
new situation, like a trampoline.  In the situation condition, four-year-olds followed the 
data and predicted that Mary, a new character, would also be scared by the skateboard but 
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not the diving board. However, six-year-olds thought the character would act the same in 
both situations, in spite of the data, consistent with a trait bias.  
 
 In another series of studies participants had to infer an abstract principle about a 
machine that played music when you put some block combinations on it and not others 
(Lucas, Bridgers, Griffiths, & Gopnik, 2014). The machine could work on an  
“individual” principle, some individual blocks made the machine go, some didn’t – each 
cause did or did not lead to the effect. Adults assume that causal systems work this way, 
just as they assume that actions are caused by traits (Cheng, 1997). But the machine 
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could also work on a more unusual “combination” principle, in which causes have to be 
combined to produce an effect: some two-block combinations made the machine go, 
though individual blocks did not.  
We showed four-year-old children and adults an unambiguous pattern of events 
that supported one principle or the other. Then they saw an ambiguous pattern with a new 
set of blocks, which could be consistent with either the “individual” or “combination” 
principle. Then we asked them to activate the machine.  
If the machine worked on the combination principle, multiple blocks would be 
necessary to make it go; a single block should suffice on the individual principle. Again, 
children had to generalize beyond particular hypotheses about which specific block 
combinations made the machine go and infer a general principle about how the machine 
worked. 
Preschoolers correctly learned both the individual and combination principles 
from the unambiguous examples and used them to interpret the ambiguous new data and 
design the right action (Fig 2a). The adults stuck with the individual principle even when 
the evidence weighed against it – they continued to place individual blocks on the 






The third study looked at a different kind of abstract causal principle. Older 
children (and non-human primates) have difficulty with higher-order “relational” 
concepts like “same” and “different” (Gentner, 2010; Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008). 
Chimpanzees quickly learn that a square stimulus leads to a reward, while a round one 
does not, but need hundreds of trials to learn that a reward follows when two stimuli are 
the same, rather than different.  
 We gave 18-30-month-olds a causal higher-order relation problem (Walker & 
Gopnik, 2013, 2014). A machine played music when an experimenter put two similar 
blocks on it but not when she put two different blocks on, or vice-versa. Toddlers then 
had to choose between two novel pairs of blocks to activate the machine, two the same 
and two different.  
 Surprisingly, these toddlers were adept at the task, in contrast to the failure of 
older children in previous studies. Then we gave three–year-olds exactly the same task as 
the toddlers. They performed at chance. Further studies showed that this was because 
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they assumed that the individual objects, rather than the relations between them, would 
activate the machine, in spite of the data.  
 So the same counter-intuitive pattern emerged across all three studies. But why 
would children perform worse as they grow older? This is still an open question, but we 
propose two potential explanations below. 
A lot of knowledge can be a dangerous thing 
 First, the very fact that older learners know more may make it more difficult for 
them to learn something new. Once a learner has inferred a general principle (such as that 
people act because of their traits, or that individual objects have causal powers, rather 
than combinations of objects or relations between them), that principle may constrain 
their interpretation of new data.  Causal relationships conflicting with that principle may 
then be more difficult to learn. 
 Probabilistic model based approaches to cognitive development (e.g., Tenenbaum 
et al 2010; Gopnik, 2012; Gopnik & Wellman 2012; Kushnir & Xu, 2012 provide a more 
precise version of this idea.  A Bayesian learner assesses how likely various hypotheses 
are, given a pattern of new data. Learners do this by using Bayes rule to combine two 
probabilities. One is the prior probability of any particular hypothesis – how likely the 
hypothesis was before the learner saw the data. The other is the “likelihood” – how likely 
it was that that hypothesis would have generated the new data.  
As a result, if the prior probability distribution strongly favors one hypothesis, 
that is, the learner initially thinks that hypothesis A is much more likely than B, the 
learner will need more evidence to overturn A and accept B instead. If the prior is “flat”, 
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that is, if the learner initially thinks that A and B are equally likely, then the learner will 
require less evidence to accept B.  
In an extension of this idea, called hierarchical Bayesian learning (Griffiths and 
Tenenbaum, 2007), data at a more specific level, like the relations between stomach 
aches and food, can be used to learn a higher-level principle – the overhypothesis that 
illnesses have biological causes. This kind of learning might explain the counter-intuitive 
pattern in our studies.   
  From flexibility to efficiency 
 Another factor may be that as children grow older there are changes in the way 
they learn that make them intrinsically less flexible and less able to attend to unusual 
possibilities. There are complementary computational, neuroscientific and evolutionary 
reasons for thinking this might be true.  
 A Bayesian learner, whether it’s a child or a computer, must have some technique 
for searching through the vast space of possible hypotheses and trying to find the most 
likely option. Recent studies have explored the search methods children might use (e.g., 
Denison et al. 2013, Bonawitz et al. 2014a,b).  
Using an analogy to physics, computer scientists talk about different search 
“temperatures”. In “high temperature” searches, the learner searches broadly but is less 
likely to “settle” on any one answer for long – the learner bounces widely around in the 
space of hypotheses like a molecule bouncing around in a hot liquid.   
From a Bayesian perspective, raising the temperature of a search will have an 
effect equivalent to “flattening” the prior – initial differences among hypotheses will 
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make less of a difference. In addition, however, it will have the effect of weakening the 
likelihoods.  
High-temperature searches are wide-ranging but very variable, and the learner can 
move away from good hypotheses as well as bad ones. Low-temperature searches are 
more likely to quickly lead to “good enough” hypotheses. However, the learner risks 
getting stuck in a “local minimum” -- passing up potentially better but more unusual 
hypotheses that are further away from their initial guess.  
One way to compromise between the advantages and drawbacks of high and low 
temperature is to start with a high-temperature search and gradually “cool off”. This is 
called  “simulated annealing” in computer science, by analogy to the heating and cooling 
that leads to robustness in metallurgy (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, & Vecchi, 1983). By 
beginning with a high-temperature search, a learner can explore the possibilities more 
widely, before they focus more narrowly on the likely candidates. 
 If children initially perform high-temperature searches and gradually “cool off” to 
perform low-temperature ones as they grow older, this might explain why younger 
learners sometimes infer unusual hypotheses better than older learners. How could we 
discriminate between this “simulated annealing” idea and the related “flat prior” idea? In 
Lucas et al. we included a “baseline” condition.  Participants only saw the ambiguous 
events, they never saw the unambiguous new data that pointed to each principle. If adults 
initially think that the “individual” hypothesis is more likely than the “combination” 
hypothesis, and children don’t, that should be reflected in this baseline condition. But, in 
fact, both children and adults preferred the “individual” hypothesis initially. The 
difference seemed to be that children were more willing to switch to the alternative 
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hypothesis. A Bayesian model consistent with the annealing possibility matched 
children’s judgments. However, more studies of the dynamics of learning are necessary 
to distinguish these possibilities. 
 Neuroscience also meshes well with the annealing idea (e.g., Thompson-Schill, 
Ramscar, & Chrysikou, 2009). An early period of neural flexibility and plasticity is 
succeeded by a more narrow and inflexible, though more efficient, set of procedures. In 
particular, as children get older, frontal areas of the brain exert more control over other 
areas. This frontal control is associated with focused attention, and better planning and 
executive control. However, this control has costs. Empirically, disruptions to frontal 
control, resulting in a more “child-like” brain, can actually lead to better performance in 
cognitive tasks that involve exploring a wide range of possibilities.(eg Chysikou et al. 
2013). There may be an intrinsic trade-off between exploitation and exploration, between 
swift, focused, efficient adult action, and wide-ranging, exploratory child-like learning. 
A pattern of early cognitive exploration also makes sense from an evolutionary 
perspective. Across many species, flexibility, brain size, and intelligence are associated 
with a long, protected period of immaturity – a long childhood. Human beings have the 
largest brains, most flexible intelligence and longest childhood of any species. One 
explanation for this distinctive “life history” is that an early protected period allows 
young organisms to explore possibilities in an unconstrained way. This early exploratory 
learning, in turn, allows learners to act more effectively when they grow older 
(Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, & Gopnik, 2012). Childhood may be evolution’s way 
of performing simulated annealing. 
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Adults may sometimes be better at the tried and true, while children are more 
likely to discover the weird and wonderful. This may be because as we get older we both 




Figure 1: Mean person (versus situation) attributions in different conditions for 4 and 6-
year-olds, out of two. 4-year–olds correctly explain actions in terms of personal traits in 
the person condition and in terms of situations in the situation condition. In a control 
condition, which supports both types of attributions equally, they are at chance. 6-year-
olds show a marked bias towards personal trait explanations in the control and situation 
conditions. Error bars show standard errors. 
 
Figure 2: Children’s and adults’ choices of objects to activate a machine, after seeing 
evidence that a machine operates according to an individual or combination principle. (a) 
When both age groups saw evidence for a combination principle, meaning that two or 
more "blickets" were necessary to activate the machine, only children tended to choose 
multiple objects to activate the machine. In contrast, adults tended to choose only one 
object, despite the evidence. (b) When both age groups saw evidence for an individual 
principle, meaning that only one “blicket” was necessary to activate the machine, both 
children and adults tended to choose a single object to place on the machine, consistent 
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